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ABSTRACT
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is a physical system that leverages manufacturing pro-
cess variations to generate unclonable and inherent instance-specific measurements of physical ob-
jects. PUF is equivalent to human biometrics in many ways where each human has a unique
fingerprint. PUF can securely generate unique and unclonable signatures that allow PUF to boot-
strap the implementation of various physical security issues. In this thesis, we discuss PUFs, extend
it to a novel SW-PUF, and explore some techniques to utilize it in security applications.
We first present the “SW-PUF” - basic building block of this thesis, a novel PUF design that
measures processor chip ALU silicon biometrics in a manner similar to all PUFs. Additionally, it
composes the silicon measurement with the data-dependent delay of a particular program instruc-
tion in a way that is difficult to decompose through a mathematical model. We then implement
the proposed PUF to solve various security issues for applications such as Software Protection
and Trusted Computing. We prove that the SW-PUF can provide a more robust root of trust for
measurement than the existing trusted platform module (TPM).
Second, we present the “Reversible SW-PUF”, a novel PUF design based on the SW-PUF
that is capable of computing partial inputs given its outputs. Given the random output signature
of specific instruction in a specific basic block of the program, only the computing platform that
originally computed the instruction can accurately regenerate the inputs of the instruction correctly
within a certain number of bits. We then implement the Reversible SW-PUF to provide a verifiable
computation method. Our scheme links the outsourced software with the cloud-node hardware to
provide proof of the computational integrity and the resultant correctness of the results with high
probability.
Finally, we employ the SW-PUF and the Reversible SW-PUF to provide a trust attribute for
data on the Internet of Thing (IoT) systems by combining data provenance and privacy-preserving
xi
methods. In our scheme, an IoT server can ensure that the received data comes from the IoT
device that owns it. In addition, the server can verify the integrity of the data by validating the
provenance metadata for data creation and modification.
1
CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
In an ideal world where hackers don’t exist, computer security is not an issue. While computer
and mobile device users can simply and blindly use their devices to perform a variety of sensitive
tasks (e.g., accessing bank accounts, paying bills, or outsourcing computation), in the real world
maintaining trust and security is, unfortunately, a very challenging task, with a new software
vulnerability reported every day. Scholars continuously propose new security solutions while hackers
continuously try to find a back door for overcoming these solutions. This battle between scholars and
hackers every day keeps the door open for a better security system. With the rapid development of
the new technology, maintaining security and trust for users’ sensitive data is even more important.
A Physical Unclonable Function (PUF) is employed to solve various hardware security issues,
such as authentication, secret key generation, and software licensing. However, the traditional
PUFs are not well-suited for many emerging security issues because they are vulnerable to observe
once, run everywhere (OORE) attacks. The work in this thesis explores robust PUFs that compose
the silicon measurement with the data-dependent delay of a particular program instruction in a way
that is difficult to decompose through a mathematical model. This feature of the PUF is employed
to provide various security solutions.
In the first part of this thesis, we propose a novel SW-PUF design approach. Then we employ the
proposed PUF to provide reliable and secure platforms that offer more robust bases of measurement
trust than the existing trusted platform module (TPM). Next, we extend our PUF design to a
reversible SW-PUF, where the new reverse computing capability provides an efficient mechanism
for verifiable computations in the cloud computing domain.
In the last part of this thesis, we present a privacy-preserving data provenance solution that




This Section reviews background and prior work related to the topic of this thesis that are going
to be presented in the following chapters. A brief background of PUF types and their applications
is introduced in Section 1.1.1. Section 1.1.2 reviews the definition and some prior work on Trusted
Computing issues. A definition of the Verifiable Computations and some prior work is presented
in section 1.1.3. Finally, section 1.1.4, introduces an overview of the Data Provenance.
1.1.1 Physical Unclonable Function overview
In Integrated Circuits (IC) technology many parameters of chip production are not fully con-
trolled. Timing parameters, for example, are sensitive to process variations that can be caused by
factors such as contamination, metal and oxide thickness variations. These factors result in small
variations for each IC; meaning that each chip is unique and no two physical objects are exactly
the same even if they have been fabricated under the same conditions. However, such variations
are usually not significant enough to affect chip performance. To facilitate the extraction of such
unique physical characteristics, a physically unclonable function could be implemented. A PUF
is a mathematical function that is derived from a physical system to generate unique signatures
(responses Ri) to a corresponding (challenges Ci), where the challenge-response relation is defined
by a process variability of semiconductor devices ( Kawa et al. (2006)). Typical PUF responses
are random, unpredictable and almost impossible to reproduce. The applications of PUFs mainly
relate to physical security tasks of a low-cost, resource-constrained electronic device.
1.1.1.1 Classification of PUFs
Many types of PUFs have been presented in the literature, PUFs can be categorized based
on different properties. For example, PUFs can be classified based on operation and construction
principles into three classes: silicon PUFs, electronic PUFs, and non-electronic PUFs.
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Silicon PUFs
Silicon PUFs are implanted on a silicon IC chip, they exploit the unmanageable CMOS man-
ufacturing process variations to generate a unique stamp to characterize each IC chip. There are
two major types of silicon PUFs: Delay-based silicon PUFs and memory-based silicon PUFs. The
most popular delay-based PUFs are the Ring Oscillator PUFs which were proposed for the first
time by Gassend (2003) and the arbiter PUFs which were introduced by Lim et al. (2005).
Figure 1.1 shows the basic implementation of the Ring Oscillators (RO) circuit. The basic
structure consists of several identical ring oscillators, an n-to-2 multiplexer, two counters, and a
comparator. Each of the identical ROs oscillates has a different frequency due to manufacturing
process variations. To generate an unpredictable sequence of bits, one pair of ring oscillators is
selected then the counters will count the oscillation cycles for a certain period of time.
Figure 1.1 Ring Oscillator PUF basic structure.
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Electronic PUFs
Electronic PUFs are based on analog measurements of electric properties of an object such as
power, resistance, and capacitance. Coating PUF - which has been proposed by Skoric et al.
(2007) - is one example of electronics PUFs. It can be implemented on the top metal layer of an
IC chip and the randomness of capacitance measurements between each pair of metal wires will be
employed to generate a unique identifier for each IC chip.
Non-electronic PUFs
Non-electronic PUFs involve all functions based on non-electric technologies or materials. How-
ever, most of the time, an electronic and digital techniques will be employed to process the challenge
/response pairs. The non- electronic PUFs are the oldest types of PUFs and are usually based on
random reflection of optical fibers or lasers. A popular example of non-electronic PUF is the Optical
PUF as proposed by Pappu et al. (2002a) . Figure 1.2 illustrates the basic implementation of an
Optical PUF, which consists of a transparent material such as glass. When a coherent laser beam
shines on the material, a totally random and unique pattern could be and recorded. This pattern
is almost impossible to reproduced because it depends on the position of the scattering particles
and the characteristics of the laser beam such as wavelength, angle, and location.
Figure 1.2 Optical PUF basic structure.
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1.1.1.2 Properties of PUFs
There are a wide variety of properties for PUF that have been proposed in the literature - Roel
(2012). Not all of these properties are required to define an acceptable PUF. Each set of specific
properties can be useful in a specific application and the remaining properties can be nice-to-have
qualities. In this section we will only list the most important properties that are required for
physical security solutions, which are:
• Unique: The responses of the PUF must include some unique information about the identity
of the actual physical entity.
• Unclonable: It is the core property of a PUF. This means that it should not be possible to
clone the exact physical entity even if it was manufactured in the same production process as
the original.
• Reproducible: The response of the PUF must be reproducible up to a small error.
• Unpredictable: The response of the PUF must be hard to predict giving only the challenge.
1.1.1.3 Evaluations of PUFs
There are three Common metrics to evaluate the PUFs responses:
• Uniqueness: Uniqueness measures the capability to distinguish between different devices.
Hamming Distances (HD) between PUF responses are used to measure uniqueness. An ideal
HD between any two PUF responses is 50%.
• Randomness: Randomness evaluates two properties in a PUF signature by analyzing the
distribution of 0’s and 1’s, the independence and the uniformity.
• Reliability: Reliability measures robustness of a PUF in the presence of environmental varia-
tions. Temperature variations are the main factor that affect the stability of a PUF response.
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1.1.1.4 Applications of PUFs
PUFs can be deployed in many applications based on their properties. Providing a physical
security solution is one of the most popular applications. This could be achieved by deploying
an appropriate PUF in a scheme together with other software or hardware to improve its char-
acteristics. Very broad application based on PUFs have been proposed in the past staring with
applications that require some sort of randomness such as random number generators, and crypto-
graphic key generation Aldaghri and Mahdavifar (2018). PUFs also seem to be an elegant solution
for application that require device authentication where some device property can be obtained from
process variation as proposed by Suh and Devadas (2007a). The authors in Guo et al. (2018)
have also employed PUFs in Cryptographic applications.
1.1.2 Trusted Computing
Trusted computing refers to hardware components and software technologies that together pro-
vide confidence that a computing platform will operate as expected. In other words, trusted com-
puting can solve computer security problems using additional hardware. A group of international
industry hardware manufacturers and software vendors had formed a not-for-profit organization
called the Trusted Computing Group (TCG) for developing some policies and specifications to
combining trusted hardware with various computing platforms. These specifications help protect
data, hardware, and other resources from stealing, damage, or compromise without adversely im-
pacting the rights of participating individuals or businesses. A Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
is a major building block in achieving the goals of a TCG. The TPM uses hardware and associated
software to provide a trusted computing base.
1.1.2.1 Trusted Platform Module
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is a hardware chip that is embedded within a trusted comput-
ing platform to provide a hardware root of trust. An asymmetric public, private key pair embedded
into TPM serves to prove its unique identity. The TPM can securely store cryptographic keys which
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can be used to authenticate the platform and protect its information. The TPM’s design relies on
the host platform for software measurements. It receives the measurements of the platform com-
ponents performed by measuring software started on the CPU at boot stage. It stores these values
in Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) then extends these values at each stage. Thus, the
TPM serves as a root of trust for reporting the measurement rather than performing the actual
measurement. The TPM is able to hash and report the actual measurements from an untrusted
environment. It is impossible for the TPM to verify these measurements. Figure 1.3 shows the
major components of a TPM.
Figure 1.3 TPM major components.
Platform Configuration Register (PCR)
Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) are one of the essential features of a TPM; they are
used to store hash digests that represent platform integrity measurements. PCRs are shielded inside
the TPM where data is protected against interference and exposure. PCRs are designed to allow
a secure representation of the host system’s configuration metric, which can be used to monitor
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any changes in the software and hardware configurations. The hash value of any PCR is updated
by concatenating a new digest value with the original digest value, followed by a hash operation
whose result is stored back to the PCR.
1.1.3 Verifiable Computations
Cloud computing has had significant growth in recent years, which attracted interest in the
domain of Verifiable Computation (VC). Cloud computing is a popular choice for many individuals
and small businesses for all the benefits such as enhanced productivity, increased efficiency, and
saving money. Computation and resource starved mobile devices also tend to perform their heavy-
duty computation on the cloud. However, the security and the correctness of cloud computing are
a critical concern due to the sensitivity and importance of the data outsourced to the Cloud. The
concept of verifiable computation allows a lower-resource client to safely outsource the computation
of a program to an untrusted cloud. This cloud performs the computation and provides a proof
asserting their correctness, the client can verify that the produced results are consistent with the
program specification and that the computations were performed correctly. To be viable, the effort
of performing the verification must be negligible compared to the actual computation.
Figure 1.4 Verifiable computation scenario.
Three main solutions were proposed in the literature to support verifiable computation: Veri-
fiable Computation based on Trusted Computing as proposed by Sailer et al. (2004), and Chen
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et al. (2006). This approach depends on some trusted hardware such as TPM. The main drawback
of this solution was the assumption that the physical protections cannot be defeated. The second
solution is Verifiable Computation with a Non-Interactive Argument. It is described by Parno
et al. (2013), and Parno et al. (2016). This approach relies on complex Probabilistically Checkable
Proofs (PCPs) or Fully-Homomorphic Encryption (FHE). However, this theoretical solution is not
practical because it requires thousands of years to be executed, even for a simple computation.
The last solution is Verifiable Computation with Interactive Proofs which was proposed by Vu
et al. (2013), and Thaler et al. (2012). This protocol involves an exchange of massive number of
messages between the cloud and the client. During this conversation, the cloud aims to convince
the client that the computation is performed correctly. While this approach is often efficient, it
applies only to a narrow class of computations.
1.1.4 Data Provenance
Data provenance refers to the process of maintaining data integrity and authenticity by recording
the data origin, entities, processes, and systems that impact data of interest. Data provenance
describes the data life cycle and tracks the data as it goes through diverse processes. In this thesis,
we are interested particularly in the data provenance protocols for IoT systems, where such systems
have many resource-constraints.
Recently, several data provenance protocols have been investigated in literature. For instance,
the protocol proposed by Sanchez et al. (2018) extended the IBM Idemix protocol with a non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof to sign the metadata transmitted by an IoT device in a privacy-
preserving way. However, this solution is limited only for some types of systems. Another work
proposed by Alharbi and Lin (2012) investigated the privacy-preserving data provenance. However,
their design relies on the trust of the server itself on an ecosystem. Few other techniques established
a secure data provenance based on PUFs. The protocol proposed by Javaid et al. (2018) used
PUF with blockchain network in order to add a unique hardware fingerprint of each IoT device.
Their proposed solution depends on storing many Challenge Response Pairs (CRPs) in the server
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memory exposing them to storage attack concerns. Aman et al. (2017) have used the Received
Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) along with PUF and symmetric encryption to provide the privacy
of the transmitted metadata between the IoT device and the server. Similar to the work proposed
by Javaid et al. (2018), this scheme also relies on storing many challenge-response pairs (CRPs)
in the server; in addition it also relies on the RSSI values which is not practical in some IoT
environments.
1.2 Thesis Contributions
In this thesis, we make the following contributions:
• Propose a novel PUF design, “SW-PUF”, that measures processor chip ALU silicon biometrics
and composes them with the data-dependent delay of a particular program.
• Propose a protocol for third-party verification using the SW-PUF for measuring software
activity at run-time to ensure the control-flow integrity of a program.
• Present a static root of trust scheme based on the proposed PUF that can offer more advanced
protection than the TPM.
• A VLSI area and energy analyses are performed for a subset of TPM commands to compare
the SW-PUF with TPM.
• Extend the SW-PUF design to make it reversible. The new PUF is able to compute partial
inputs after being given its outputs.
• Develop a protocol based on the reversible SW-PUF based on the Bayesian method for Veri-
fiable Computations in cloud computing within the class of interactive proof systems.
• evaluate our verifiable computation scheme to demonstrate that it yields faster verification
than previous approaches.
• Present a privacy-preserving data provenance solution that merges the SW-PUF with non-
interactive zero-knowledge proof to provide trustworthy and dependable IoT systems.
11
• Implement the proposed data provenance protocol on FPGA Altera Cyclone, for evaluating
the scheme that was developed in this work.
1.3 Thesis Outline
This section outlines the structure of the thesis and provides a brief review of each chapter.
The thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter 1: The first chapter briefly introduces the motivation of this research, and separately
outlines the contributions of each chapter.
Chapter 2: In this chapter, we introduce the design, implementation and evaluation of a
new type of PUFs. The proposed PUF is given the name of ”SW-PUF”. Then we developed
and evaluated protocols based on this PUF to provide trusted computing and software integrity
measurement solutions.
Chapter 3: In this chapter, we introduce the design, implementation and evaluation of a new
type of PUFs, which we called ”reversible SW-PUF”. Then we proposed and evaluated a protocol
based on this PUF to provide a Verifiable Computations base for cloud computing within the class
of interactive proof systems.
Chapter 4: In this chapter, we developed and evaluated a privacy-preserving data provenance
scheme that is based on the SW-PUF and the reversible SW-PUF to provide trustworthy and
dependable IoT systems.
Chapter 5: In this chapter, we summarize the most important findings of this thesis and
propose a number of future research directions.
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Chen, L., Landfermann, R., Löhr, H., Rohe, M., Sadeghi, A.-R., and Stüble, C. (2006). A protocol
for property-based attestation. In Proceedings of the First ACM Workshop on Scalable Trusted
Computing, STC ’06, pages 7–16, New York, NY, USA. ACM.
Gassend, B. L. P. (2003). Physical random functions. PhD thesis, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Guo, Y., Dee, T., and Tyagi, A. (2018). Barrel shifter physical unclonable function based encryp-
tion. Cryptography, 2(3):22.
Javaid, U., Aman, M. N., and Sikdar, B. (2018). Blockpro: Blockchain based data provenance and
integrity for secure iot environments. In Proceedings of the 1st Workshop on Blockchain-enabled
Networked Sensor Systems, pages 13–18. ACM.
Kawa, J., Chiang, C. C., and Camposano, R. (2006). EDA challenges in nano-scale technology. In
CICC, pages 845–851. IEEE.
Lim, D., Lee, J. W., Gassend, B., Suh, G. E., Van Dijk, M., and Devadas, S. (2005). Extracting
secret keys from integrated circuits. IEEE Transactions on Very Large Scale Integration (VLSI)
Systems, 13(10):1200–1205.
Pappu, R., Recht, B., Taylor, J., and Gershenfeld, N. (2002). Physical one-way functions. Science,
297(5589):2026–2030.
Parno, B., Howell, J., Gentry, C., and Raykova, M. (2013). Pinocchio: Nearly practical verifiable
computation. In Proceedings of the 2013 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, SP ’13,
pages 238–252, Washington, DC, USA. IEEE Computer Society.
Parno, B., Howell, J., Gentry, C., and Raykova, M. (2016). Pinocchio: Nearly practical verifiable
computation. Commun. ACM, 59(2):103–112.
Roel, M. (2012). Physically unclonable functions: Constructions, properties and applications.
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, Belgium.
Sailer, R., Zhang, X., Jaeger, T., and van Doorn, L. (2004). Design and implementation of a tcg-
based integrity measurement architecture. In Proceedings of the 13th Conference on USENIX
Security Symposium - Volume 13, SSYM’04, pages 16–16, Berkeley, CA, USA. USENIX Associ-
ation.
13
Sanchez, J. L. C., Bernabe, J. B., and Skarmeta, A. F. (2018). Towards privacy preserving data
provenance for the internet of things. In 2018 IEEE 4th World Forum on Internet of Things
(WF-IoT), pages 41–46. IEEE.
Skoric, B., Schrijen, G.-J., Ophey, W., Wolters, R., Verhaegh, N., and van Geloven, J. (2007).
Experimental hardware for coating pufs and optical pufs. In Security with Noisy Data, pages
255–268. Springer.
Suh, G. E. and Devadas, S. (2007). Physical unclonable functions for device authentication and
secret key generation. In 2007 44th ACM/IEEE Design Automation Conference, pages 9–14.
IEEE.
Thaler, J., Roberts, M., Mitzenmacher, M., and Pfister, H. (2012). Verifiable computation with
massively parallel interactive proofs. In HotCloud. USENIX Association.
Vu, V., Setty, S. T. V., Blumberg, A. J., and Walfish, M. (2013). A hybrid architecture for
interactive verifiable computation. In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, pages 223–237.
IEEE Computer Society.
14
CHAPTER 2. PHYSICAL UNCLONABLE FUNCTIONS (PUFS)
ENTANGLED TRUSTED COMPUTING BASE
Modified from a paper accepted by IEEE-iSES 2019 conference
Hala Hamadeh and Akhilesh Tyagi
Best paper award winner
2.1 Abstract
The center-piece of this chapter is a software measurement physical unclonable function (PUF).
It measures processor chip ALU silicon biometrics in a manner similar to all PUFs. Additionally,
it composes the silicon measurement with the data-dependent delay of a particular program in-
struction in a way that is difficult to decompose through a mathematical model. This approach
ensures that each software instruction is measured if computed. This constitutes a more robust
root of trust for measurement than the existing trusted platform module (TPM). The SW-PUF
measurements bind the execution of software to a specific processor with a corresponding certificate.
This makes the SW-PUF a promising candidate for applications requiring Software Protection and
Trusted Computing. For instance, it could measure the integrity of an execution path by generat-
ing a signature that is unique to the specific program execution path and the processor chip. To
explore the feasibility of the proposed schemes, the SW-PUF have been implemented in HSPICEk-
2015.06 using 45 nm technology. It is analyzed in term of three metrics: uniqueness, reliability,
and randomness. Our proof-of-concept implementation shows good uniqueness compared to other
types of PUFs, the average Hamming distance between a pair of responses over different software
PUFs (different instruction input data) was 32% (50%). The SW-PUF exhibits more than 96%
reliability for temperatures from −10°C to 65°C. The randomness was measured with NIST suite
of 14 tests - wherein 12-13 tests were consistently passed with a minimum pass rate of 90.6%. A
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Verilog synthesis based comparison of SW-PUF versus TPM area and energy shows that area needs
of SW-PUF are less than 0.01% of TPM area needs and energy of SW-PUF is less than 0.0001%
of TPM energy.
2.2 Introduction
The VLSI fabrication technology at small scale is statistical by nature. Many parameters of
chip production are not fully controlled. Timing parameters, for example, are sensitive to process
variations that can be caused by factors such as contamination, metal and oxide thickness variations,
and lithography variations. These factors result in small variations in threshold voltage and gate
oxide thickness for each logical gate; meaning that each chip is unique and no two transistors are
identical in delay even if they have been fabricated under the same conditions. Such variations are
usually not significant enough to affect circuit performance by stretching the clock period to hide
these variations. The differences in process parameters can be exposed at sub-clock period level
to generate a unique chip biometric identity to provide authentication for each chip. A Physical
Unclonable Function (PUF) is a physical system to leverage such process variations to generate
a response to a challenge Kawa et al. (2006). Traditional Challenge-Response Pair (CRP) PUFs
are not well-suited for the software protection problem in offline settings as stated by Nithyanand
and Solis (2012a) because they are vulnerable to observe once, run everywhere (OORE) attacks.
Nithyanand and Solis (2012a) argue that the PUF measurements should be interleaved at a finer
granularity than the whole program to achieve robust software protection.
Within a processor, the datapath elements (which are all silicon-based) are the function units
that interact to perform the computation of a software instruction. Program inputs determine the
execution path which determines what input data is received by each function unit. The delays
of a function unit that can be attributed to the instruction input data values become in a loose
manner the execution path identity. Combining these delays with silicon variation based delays
in a non-decomposable manner will allow us to realize a PUF for composite identity of software
and processor. We accomplish this goal of entangling the program instruction level inputs with
16
function unit level silicon variability in a novel SW-PUF design that composes the data-dependent
delay variation in a function unit with the silicon process level delay variation to measure both the
software and the device. The measurement reflects both the program instruction input values and
process level variation within the processor chip function unit. The function unit delay variation
results from both the process variation (hardware dependent) and the function unit data inputs
(software dependent). In a five-stage pipeline MIPS implementation, a typical software instruction-
mix consists of the ALU, load/store, and control class of instructions. The ALU instructions use
the ALU for the desired computation. The address computation of a load/store instruction uses
an ALU unit, the control instructions also use the ALU unit for branch target address calculation.
A datapath ALU design that automatically measures each instruction enables a root of trust for
measurement to ensure that each instruction in the software is measured through the ALU. In our
approach, the existing ALU unit is repurposed slightly to function as a virtual PUF as a side-effect.
The design of the SW-PUF has been evaluated in HSPICE using predictive technology model
and tested on 8 FPGAs. The evaluation of this ALU PUF reveals excellent randomness, acceptable
uniqueness, and satisfactory reliability. As in any traditional PUF, use of error correction is needed
to ensure the reproducibility in its response. Herder et al. (2017) presented a good error correction
scheme. However, in this work, the focus is on the design and implementation of the SW-PUF
to assess its feasibility for software verification. The robustness properties such as reproducibility
through error correction would be the target of future research.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.3, we summarize the existing work
on PUFs and describe relevant concepts. In section 2.4, we describe the design of the classic RCA.
Section 2.5 presents the design of the proposed SW-PUF. In Section 2.6, we describe software
integrity measurement framework. We then compare the SW-PUF with a TPM in Section 2.7. The




Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) or Physical One-Way Functions (P-OWFs) were first
proposed in 2002 by Pappu et al. (2002b). PUFs are mostly implemented based on timing and
delay variation of silicon circuits. Our proposed design is also based on such timing parameters
variability; however, other kinds of PUFs have also been proposed. For example, Guajardo et al.
(2007a) proposed a Memory-Based PUF that uses SRAM memory randomness, while Pappu et al.
(2002b) proposed a non-electronic optical PUF that depends on the speckle patterns of an optical
medium under laser illumination. PUFs are suitable for use in many applications such as hardware
authentication as presented by Suh and Devadas (2007b), Intellectual Property (IP) protection such
as the work presented by Guajardo et al. (2007b), software protection presented by Nithyanand
and Solis (2012b), cryptographic key generation presented by Guajardo et al. (2007b), and PUF-
based RFID for anti-counterfeiting presented by Devadas et al. (2008). PUFs also have been used
on a mobile device to support authentication presented by Scheel and Tyagi (2015).
There are several research efforts to build a PUF out of an ALU. Kong et al. proposed ALU
PUF which is based on the delay difference in two identical ALUs along the lines of an arbiter
PUF Kong et al. (2014). They proposed to combine the output of the ALU PUF with the
checksum computation in a remote attestation mechanism to bind the computation to hardware
ALU. However, their ALU PUF does not seem to have any program data-dependent properties
tying it to the execution of a program - unlike this research. They used two modes for the ALU,
one is the normal mode and the other is to perform the PUF operation.
PUFs are also used with TPM to enhance security. Choi and Kim (2012) proposed to protect
the keys inside the TPM through the use of key-hiding with a PUF. In a similar work presented
by Li et al. (2016), Chatterjee et al. (2018), the authors present approaches for enhancing the
security of key hierarchy in a TPM using PUF. Lebedev et al. (2018) and Müller et al. (2018)
proposed to use PUF in order to build a secure boot. However, all the existing TPM solutions suffer
from a major problem since it is impossible for the TPM to verify the received measurements. Our
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approach differs from the TPM principally in that all the measurements occur within trusted
boundaries inside the CPU.
2.4 Background
2.4.1 Ripple Carry Adder (RCA)
A ripple carry adder is constructed by chaining stages of full adders, with the carry output
from each full adder rippling as a carry input to the next full adder. For simplicity, a 4-bit RCA is
shown in Figure 2.1. The final sum of the most significant bit becomes valid after the carry signal
has rippled all the way through the adder, from the least significant stage to the most significant
stage, in the worst case. The worst-case delay through an n-bit RCA occurs when a carry signal
ripples from the least significant bit to the most significant bit through all stages; its approximate




tc) + ts (2.1)
where tc is the delay through the carry stage of a single full adder and ts is the delay in
computing the final correct sum. However, the average carry chain length is O(log n) when random
input data is presented by Parhami (2009). Garside (1993) determined that the average carry
propagation length was 4 for a 32-bit adder. Each full adder contains 5 gates: 1 OR, 2 ANDs, and
2 XORs, and every gate has a different propagation delay, so the total delay at each stage will be
unique due to process level variations. The total delay of the adder depends on the carry chain
length and the delay of each stage. Since these factors can be identical only if the inputs to the
adder and the physical adder itself remain unchanged, we can state that this delay is unique for
each set of input data and processor.
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Figure 2.1 4-bits RCA circuit
2.5 The Principle of SW-PUF Design
The design of the SW-PUF aims to capture the delay variations caused by the fabrication
process and input data. The proposed ALU schema is shown in Figure 2.2. In this design, the ALU
output is sampled twice - once at the normal worst case clock period which is chosen to be long
enough to hide transistor level delay variability and the data-dependent delay variability; while the
shifted-clock is chosen to sample the ALU output early. The time period of the early-sampling
shifted-clock should be less than the average of the total delay of the ALU, which is log n as stated
by Burks et al. (1987) and Parhami (2009). This ensures that the instruction level data influences
the SW-PUF output. Inverters are used to generate a slight time shift between the clock and the
shifted-clock. The early sampled output is the SW-PUF output. The normal clock sampled output
is the data output generated by the instruction for the normal program consumption. Note that
the overhead of the proposed schema is minimal, one extra latch per output bit, in addition to the
shifted clock generation overhead.
As shown in Figure 2.2, the proposed design is very simple to implement using an existing ALU,
a D Flip-flop to latch the input data at time τ1, and a D Flip-flop to latch the output data at τ2,
where:
τ2 = τ1 + tdelay (2.2)
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Figure 2.2 The proposed architecture of the SW-PUF
The clock edge at τ2 leads the clock edge at the normal delay (τ1 + T for clock period T ) for
early output sampling. The output data will be likely random and ”noisy” at this time. In this
case, the output data of the ALU is a function of three parameters: the ALU inputs, the previous
state of the circuit, and the transistor-level variability.
2.6 Software integrity measurement
Measurement is a process of characterizing software. The reasons for measuring a software
are varied leading to a variety of measurement techniques. SW-PUF’s strength is the guarantee
that every instruction is measured in hardware. An instruction computation and its measurement
are atomic. Such software instruction measurement sequences at run-time can generate a unique
signature of a specific program execution path within its Control Flow Graph (CFG) on a specific
processor chip.
An execution path resulting in the dynamic instruction sequence: I0, I1, I2, . . . , In gener-
ates a corresponding sequence of PUF stamps in the modified processor, P0, P1, P2, . . . , Pn.
Note that the same execution path could result in different PUF stamp sequences since the same
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instruction Il (such as an add r1, r2, r3) could have different input data in r2, r3 - especially
when this data does not determine the control path for the execution. There are many ways this
PUF stamp sequence can be used for software protection and certification. For instance, control
flow integrity can be certified by creating a hash-based digest of the PUF stamp sequence similar
to TPM’s PCR extension as D0 = h(P0); Di = h(Di−1 || Pi), where h is a hash function, || denotes
concatenation, and Di is the program signature digest until the instruction Ii. Dn is the unique
certificate of the control flow and data flow that took place for the execution I0, I1, I2, . . . , In.
A third party can verify that the control flow indeed was correct by comparing such control path
PUF stamp digest. Although, due to the measurements being inextricably bound to the platform,
a verifying party would also need to obtain measurements from this original computing platform.
Figure 2.3 An Example of Software integrity measurement
2.7 Performance comparison of SW-PUF and TPM
Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is embedded within a trusted computing platform to provide a
hardware root of trust. The TPM’s design relies on the host platform for software measurements. It
receives the measurements of the platform components performed by measuring software started on
the CPU at boot stage. It stores these values in Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) extending
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these values at each stage in a manner similar to our hash chaining. Thus, the TPM serves as a
root of trust for reporting the measurement rather than performing the actual measurement. The
TPM is able to hash and report the actual measurements from an untrusted environment. It is
impossible for the TPM to verify these measurements. The Software PUF can solve this weakness in
the TPM since all the measurements occur within the trust boundaries inside the CPU. Therefore,
the SW-PUF by itself can provide a more robust TPM like static root of trust for endorsement.
However, the SW-PUFs signature (hash values of the program instructions measured) is still a
very aggregated measurement for the entire program. Verifying this kind of signature has two
shortcomings: first the verifier needs to recompute everything which requires duplication of the
entire effort, and second, the verifier needs to use the same SW-PUF at the same node since the
SW-PUF is not reproducible at another node.
In order to establish a secure boot using SW-PUF, the computer system must first boot into
a trusted state. A bootloader is typically the first program started after power-up or reset. By
running the bootloader in a CPU with SW-PUF, a unique stamp or signature can be generated.
Similar to the TPM secure boot, this stamp associated with the same hashing algorithm as in PCR
of SW-PUF measurements could provide a strong root of trust.
One of the main security services offered by a TPM is remote attestation. This allows the
system to verify its hardware and software configuration integrity to a remote party. Using SW-
PUF, a stronger remote attestation protocol could be obtained. Figure 2.4 illustrates the basic
steps on how such a system could work; additional modifications could be added such as using a
nonce to ensure that old communications cannot be reused. This protocol is introduced only as a
proof of concept.
First, at the manufacturing stage, each CPU is calibrated with a unique program (authentication
program) to generate a SW-PUF signature. This specific authentication program and its signature
need to be stored at a trusted third party called a Privacy CA. When a device receives a request
for attestation, the attestor generates an Attestation Identity Key (AIK) and sends the public part
of the key to the CA. The CA will then send back the authentication program to the attestor.
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Figure 2.4 Remote attestation protocol using SW-PUF
After running the program, the attestor sends the SW-PUF signature to the third party. The
CA will then generate a signed certificate and send it back to the attestor after validating the
SW-PUF signature or PUF stamp. The attestor can now send the received AIK certificate to the
challenger. Root of Trust for Storage (RTS) is another basic security service provided by a TPM.
A key component of secure storage is the TPM-Sealing function. TPM-Sealing is a process to bind
the encryption with device state; by which an encrypted (Sealed) data can be decrypted (Unsealed)
only in the same TPM and at the same PCR state. As shown in figures 2.5 and 2.6 SW-PUF in
forward and reverse modes could be used to seal/Unseal the data with the device state. The sealing
process takes data and cryptographic key to generate SW-PUF signature and the encrypted value.
They could then be added together to produce a sealed data package. To decrypt this package, the
same CPU needs to run in reverse mode to reproduce the encrypted data. A typical decryption
process can then be performed to generate the data.
As mentioned above, the SW-PUF can offered more advanced protection than the TPM.The
following are some threat models where the SW-PUF performs better than a TPM.
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Figure 2.5 Sealing Data using Software-PUF
Figure 2.6 UnSealing Data using SW-PUF
Masquerade attack In remote attestation process, an attacker can send TPM measurements
of another valid system to the third party. With a SW-PUF, instead, the signature of the CPU
can be generated, available only using this particular CPU.
Malicious measurement agent A malicious agent may report incorrect integrity measure-
ments to the TPM. However, all the measurements occur within the trust boundaries inside the
CPU using the SW-PUF.
Hardware attacks An attacker may reset PCRs, and store new values in them. This attack
can’t be performed using the SW-PUF since there are no stored measurements.
2.8 Experimental and Simulation Results
2.8.1 Simulation Results
Simulations of 32-bit SW-PUF were performed in HSPICE k-2015.06 using predictive technology
model HiSIM241 [13] for all NMOS/PMOS transistors with a VDD of 3 V. The HiSIM241 model
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supports Design for Manufacturability (DFM). The value of a NSUBCDFM parameter is used to
specify the substrate impurity concentration that will affect both the mobility and the threshold
voltage. To simulate fabrication process variation, different values of NSUBCDFM (between 1.0e16
to 1.0e19) were assigned to each transistor in our design for each simulation. Matlab was used
to generate random values for the NSUBCDFM parameter for each transistor which creates 16
different patterns of PUF instances. To evaluate our proposed PUF we studied three metrics:
uniqueness, randomness, and reliability.
2.8.1.1 Uniqueness
Uniqueness measures the capability to distinguish between different devices. Hamming Dis-
tances (HD) between PUF responses are used to measure uniqueness. An ideal HD between any
two PUF responses is 50% (16-bit). To evaluate the uniqueness of the proposed PUF, we ran sim-
ulations for each SW-PUF instance by applying identical challenge to produce a unique response
for each. We then measured the HD between each pair of different responses (inter-chip). A total
of 120 statistical data elements were found this way.
To determine the number of inverters or the early sampling delay needed to generate the best
response for the SW-PUF in terms of randomness and uniqueness, we studied the response of our
circuit for various inverter chain lengths used to generate the CLK signal time shift. Using Hspice
for simulation allowed us to detect the output of the adder at any time without the need for an
inverter chain. We evaluated the output data from the adder at 20%, 30%, 35%, and 40% of the
average delay. Selection of these sampling intervals was to ensure that the HD between the early
sampled adder outputs and the final result is greater than 8.
Figure 2.7 shows the Inter-chip HD distribution between pairs of 16 SW-PUF responses. The
ALU outputs were sampled at 20%, 30%, 35%, and 40% of the average delay respectively. With
20% sampling period, the maximum Hamming distance was 11 (34% of PUF response bits); the
minimum was 3 (1% of PUF response bits); and the average was 7.1 (21% of PUF response bits).
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Figure 2.7 Inter-chip HD results for different sampling delay = (A) 20% , (B) 30%, (C)
35%, and (D) 40% respectively
While with 40% sampling period, the maximum HD was 17 (53% of PUF response bits); the
minimum was 4 (13% of PUF response bits); and the average was 10.2 (32% of PUF response bits).
To evaluate the uniqueness of the SW-PUF on the same ALU under different data inputs (Intra-
chip ), we measured the average HD distribution between a pair of output data on the same device
PUF instance with different set of input data. In this case, as shown in Figure 2.8, the maximum
HD between any pair of PUF responses was 25 (78% of PUF response bits); the minimum was 10
(31% of PUF response bits); and the average was 15.8 (50% of PUF response bits).
2.8.1.2 Randomness
Randomness evaluates two properties in a PUF signature by analyzing the distribution of 0’s
and 1’s, the independence and the uniformity. In this paper we have used the standard statistical
test suite of the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) presented by Bassham
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Figure 2.8 Intra-chip HD results under inputs variations and fixed sampling delay
et al. (2010) to evaluate the responses of the SW-PUF and the reversible SW-PUF. NIST test
suite is commonly used for empirical statistical testing of uniform random number generators. The
minimum pass rate for each statistical test is approximately 90.6%. We have applied the NIST tests
to 512-bit stream that was produced from the 16 PUF instances. Table 2.1 shows the statistical
tests results that were observed at 20% (second column) and 40% (third column) sampling periods
for the SW-PUF. It was found that only one category (rank), out of fifteen statistical tests applied,
failed - in the case where the outputs of the SW-PUF were sampled at 20% of the average delay.
However, two categories (rank and non-overlapping template) failed with the 40% sampling period.
This shows that a tradeoff between randomness and uniqueness can be achieved. Larger delay
provides more uniqueness but less randomness.
2.8.1.3 Reliability
Reliability measures robustness of a PUF in the presence of environmental variations. Tem-
perature variations are the main factor that affect the stability of a PUF response. Therefore,
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Table 2.1 Summary results of statistical tests on a SW-PUF response observed at sampling
period of 20% and 40% of the average delay
#Statistical Test Avg. Success Avg. Success
Ratio at 20% Ratio at 40%
Frequency 96.875% 96.875%
Block Frequency 93.75% 93.75%
Cumulative Sums 96.875% 96.875%
Run 96.875% 96.875%
Longest Run 96.875% 100%
Rank 0% 0%





Approximate Entropy 100% 100%
Serial 93.75% 95.31%
LinearComplexity 100% 96.875%
the minimum pass rate for each statistical test is approximately 90.6%
reliability can be determined by varying the operating temperature and comparing the responses
with a reference response obtained under nominal temperature conditions for the same input. We











where Ri is the reference response at room temperature 25°C, Ri,j is a response observed under
varying temperature value for the same challenge, n is the number of bits of SW-PUF, and K is
the number of samples. Figure 2.9 shows the average reliability of the sixteen PUF instances with
operating temperature from -25°C to 75°C for four cases: sampling periods at 20%, 30%, 35%, and
40% of the average delay. The worst reliability is 91% and occurs at -25°C. However, the SW-PUF
has acceptable stability with more than 96% reliability for temperatures from -10°C to 65°C.
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Figure 2.9 The reliability of SW-PUF against temperature variations
2.8.2 Experimental Results with FPGA Implementations
In order to broaden the applicability of our results, we synthesized our SW-PUFs on an FPGA
platform as well. The Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). PUFs results can be compared
with the results obtained from the Hspice simulation. We implemented a 64-bit SW-PUF on an
Altera DE2 Development and Education Board. Since we needed to evaluate fabrication variation
between pairs of different FPGAs, we implemented our design on eight identical FPGAs.
Figure 2.11 shows the HD distributions between a pair of 8 SW-PUFs responses from different
FPGA devices with identical inputs and 2 inverter delay sampling period. With 2 inverter delay
sampling period, the maximum HD was 25; the minimum was 3; and the average was 13.2. This is
worse than the uniqueness profile of HSPICE based simulations. However, better uniqueness can
be achieved by improving the routing for the SW-PUF.
As we did in Hspice experiments, to evaluate the uniqueness of the SW-PUF based on the adder
input data, we measured the average HD distribution between pairs of the output responses on the
same FPGA with different set of input data(Intra-FPGA) . As shown in Figure 2.10, the maximum
HD between any pair of the PUF response was 38 (59% of PUF response bits); the minimum was
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Figure 2.10 Intra-FPGA HD results under inputs variations
25 (39% of PUF response bits); and the average was 32.3 (50% of PUF response bits). This is
similar to the SPICE based PUF responses.
2.8.3 Area and energy comparison of SW-PUF and TPM
The SW-PUF design has been developed using Verilog-HDL and synthesized in Cadence RTL
compiler using 45nm CMOS technology. In earlier work presented by Hamadeh et al. (2017), a
similar design flow is pursued to compare a TPM and distributed TPM. In that work, a Residue
Number System (RNS) based homomorphic share scheme for TPM is used among several IoT
devices within a cluster. The TPM functionality is distributed to 4 or 10 slices in order to reduce the
cost of the communication between the devices in the same cluster. While A full TPM functionality
is required at the inter-cluster level, where each operation is divided between the cluster member.
A VLSI area and energy for a subset of TPM commands were computed for TPM with 1024-bit
RSA key size (full functionality), 256-bit RSA key size (4 slices), and 160-bit RSA key size (10
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Figure 2.11 Inter-FPGA HD results
slices). As shown in Table 2.2. The VLSI area and energy consumption of the proposed SW-PUF
and Reversible SW-PUF are negligible compared to the smallest slice of the TPM which provides
a more efficient design.
Table 2.2 Area and energy results of SW-PUF, Reversible SW-PUF and TPM. Note that
TPM is evaluated for multiple key sizes to reflect various classes of IoTs.
SW-PUF Reversible SW-PUF TPM(1024-RSA) TPM(256-RSA) TPM(160-RSA)
Total Area 0.029mm2 0.789mm2 618.76mm2 600.52mm2 598.25mm2
Total Energy 0.00071 nJ 0.00715 nJ 4661.86 µJ 220.12µJ 25.56µJ
2.8.4 Program Level Hash Digest of SW PUF Responses
The individual program instruction level SW-PUF responses are hash-extended to generate a
program level signature. We wanted to evaluate such signatures over a collection of programs and
execution paths through the same program to assess if the program level signatures are able to
differentiate different programs or execution paths. This experiment is a preliminary assessment of
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this capability. A cycle accurate CPU simulator like SimpleScalar Austin et al. (2002) can compute
individual instruction inputs, but not the SW-PUF behavior. Pin tool Reddi et al. (2004) (dynamic
binary instrumentation tool) was used to collect instructions and instruction input data values from
SPEC 2006 CPU benchmarks executed on Intel x86 32-bit microprocessors. Since, the SW-PUF
responses were computed with HSPICE, only a small number of such responses could be evaluated
practically. Hence, a random 100 instructions for each benchmark were sampled from its execution
trace. Their PUF stamp sequences were then simulated with HSPICE k-2015.06. The program
level signatures were generated by XOR’ing the 100 randomly sampled instruction level signatures.
Figure 2.12 shows the average HD between the program level PUF stamps over 16 chips across the
SPEC 2006 benchmarks. As shown in Figure 2.12, the minimum HD between a pair of instruction
level signatures was 20.9%. Any hash function based signature extension will result in 50% HD
between a pair of program stamp digests.
Figure 2.12 HD of Program Level Hash-Extended Signatures for different devices.
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2.9 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a novel PUF design that is suitable for Software Protection & Trusted
Computing Base. We show that the proposed SW-PUF is better suited for software protection
than a TPM. We also demonstrate that it can provide a more robust static root of trust. The SW-
PUF design has been implemented on an FPGA platform (Altera DE2 Development and Education
Board). In addition, a simulation analysis in HSPICEk-2015.06 using predictive technology model
HiSIM241 was performed. The responses measured from the SW-PUF have a uniqueness of about
30%, excellent randomness, and a reliability of 96% at temperatures from -10°C to 65°C. Wang
et al. (2018) generate a stable response of a PUF by utilizing random hard defect generated from
Directed Self Assembly (DSA) process. A similar mechanism could be used to generate an ideal
response for the proposed SW-PUF.
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CHAPTER 3. PROBABILISTIC VERIFICATION OF OUTSOURCED
COMPUTATION BASED ON NOVEL REVERSIBLE PUFS
Modified from a paper accepted by ESOCC-2020 conference
Hala Hamadeh, Abdallah Almomani, and Akhilesh Tyagi
3.1 Abstract
With the growing number of commercial cloud-computing services, there is a corresponding
need to verify that such computations were performed correctly. In other words, after a weak
client outsources computations to an untrusted cloud, it must be able to ensure the correctness of
the results with less work than re-performing the computations. This is referred to as verifiable
computation. In this paper we present a new probabilistic verifiable computation method based
on a novel Reversible Physically Unclonable Function (PUF) and a binomial Bayesian Inference
model. Our scheme links the outsourced software with the cloud-node hardware to provide a proof
of the computational integrity and the resultant correctness of the results with high probability.
The proposed Reversible SW-PUF is a two-way function capable of computing partial inputs given
its outputs. Given the random output signature of a specific instruction in a specific basic block of
the program, only the computing platform that originally computed the instruction can accurately
regenerate the inputs of the instruction correct within a certain number of bits. To explore the
feasibility of the proposed design, the Reversible SW-PUF was implemented in HSPICE using
45 nm technology. The probabilistic verifiable computation scheme was implemented in C++,
and the Bayesian Inference model was utilized to estimate the probability of correctness of the
results returned from the cloud service.Our proof-of-concept implementation of Reversible SW-
PUF exhibits good uniqueness compared to other types of PUFs, and exhibits 100% reliability for
temperatures between−10°C to 65°C. The randomness was measured with the NIST suite of 14
37
tests wherein 12 tests were consistently passed. Finally, we demonstrate our verifiable computation
approach on a matrix computation. We show that it enables faster verification than existing
verification techniques.
3.2 Introduction
Verifiable Computations (VC) have attracted enormous interest and attention with the recent
growth in cloud computing. The concept of verifiable computation allows a lower-resource client
to outsource the computation of a program to an untrusted cloud. With a proof provided by the
cloud, the client can verify that the results produced are consistent with the program specification
and that the computations were performed correctly. To be viable, the effort of performing the
verification must be negligible compared to the actual computation. In recent years, interest in
physically-unclonable functions (PUFs) has evolved. PUFs have been deployed in different appli-
cations because of their ability to generate “digital fingerprints” of unique identities for a physical
system. SW-PUF Hamadeh and Tyagi (2019) is a specific type of PUF that binds software ex-
ecution to the exact hardware platform and produces unique signatures at various points in the
software’s execution. The SW-PUF signature is a promising candidate for providing a proof that
a specific computation was performed on a specific platform. By expanding the capabilities of a
SW-PUF to include invertibility and commutativity, we achieve elements of verifiable computation.
Invertibility is achieved by capturing a physical attribute such as time when an output bit settles
using reversible functions. Reversibility is obtained with transmission gates.
Contributions:
The Reversible SW-PUF: We present a novel reversible PUF design based on transmission gates
capable of generating partial input word, (challenge) consistent with a unique hardware-specific
output (response) for a given computing platform.
Probabilistic Verification Computation based on Reversible SW-PUF Scheme: We
develop a probabilistic randomized verification method built on top of the Reversible SW-PUF,
in which the server (cloud computing node) computes the results from a program and generates
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SW-PUF signatures as proof of performing the computation correctly. For verification of the re-
sults, the client can randomly pick a small number of PUF signature pairs (input, output). It can
then send only the response part to the server. Server can compute the corresponding challenge
by running its reversible SW-PUF in reverse. The client can then confirm whether the challenge
for each verification point indeed matches the original signature/proof. Finally, the client can use
a Bayesian Inference Dempster (1968) model to obtain probabilistic proof of the server’s results.
Implementation and Evaluation: The Reversible SW-PUF has been evaluated in HSPICEk-
2015.06 using predictive technology model HiSIM24. We demonstrate the efficiency and effective-
ness of the Reversible SW-PUF. The invertibility of the Reversible SW-PUF offers an alternate,
possibly more efficient, way of providing a proof of verifiable computation. To evaluate the per-
formance of the probabilistic verification computation approach, we implemented a case study
wherein a verification of matrix multiplication was performed and compared with previous works.
The results show increased efficiency.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 3.3, we summarize the existing work
on PUFs and describe relevant concepts. Section 3.4 presents reversible SW-PUF which is the
building block for verifiable computation. In section 3.5, we propose the Verifiable Computation
Scheme. The implementation and evaluation of the Reversible SW-PUF is presented in Section 3.6.
To evaluate our approach, we presents a case study of matrix multiplication in section 3.7. Finally,
Section 3.9 concludes the paper.
3.3 Related Work
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUFs) were first proposed in 2002 by Pappu et al. (2002b).
Most popular PUFs are implemented based on timing and delay variation of silicon circuits. Our
proposed design approach is also based on such timing parameters variability. On the other side,
there is a new trending to replace all digital logic with the reversible logic; therefore, There are
several research efforts to build reversible logic to replace the classical logic. For example, Dey
et al. (2019) proposed a new design of reversible PUF based on the Feynman gate.
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PUFs are suitable for use in many application to provide hardware security such as the work
presented by Choi and Kim (2012), Li et al. (2016), Lebedev et al. (2018) and Müller et al.
(2018). This paper focus on applying PUF in the verifiable computation application. Three main
solutions were proposed to support verifiable computation in the literature: verifiable computation
based on Trusted Computing Sailer et al. (2004), Chen et al. (2006). The main drawback of
this approach was the assumption that physical protections cannot be defeated. A second method,
verifiable computation with a Non-Interactive Argument, is described in Parno et al. (2013), Parno
et al. (2016). This approach is not practical because it relies on complex Probabilistically Check-
able Proofs (PCPs) or fully-homomorphic encryption (FHE). Finally, verifiable computation with
Interactive Proofs Vu et al. (2013), Thaler et al. (2012) has been proposed. While this approach
is often efficient, it applies to only a narrow class of computations.
3.4 The Reversible SW-PUF
The design of the Reversible SW-PUF is an extension of our previous work on the SW-PUF
Hamadeh and Tyagi (2019). As in the original SW-PUF, the ALU signatures of an instruction on
the reversible software PUF are generated from an early sampling of the ALU results. However, in
the reverse mode, the roles of inputs and outputs are reversed, and the early sampling is done on the
original input end. Reversible SW-PUF has two modes: forward and reverse. The forward mode
is similar to the SW-PUF where it generates a unique signature by capturing the delay variations
of carry propagation in ripple-carry adders (which is a basic component in an ALU). The delay
variation is caused by instruction input values and the silicon fabrication foundry variations. The
reverse mode computes the partial inputs from the signature and the instruction output. Early
sampling captures a subset of original input bits correctly in a platform specific manner, which itself
is a platform specific secret. Only the computing platform that originally computed the instruction
can regenerate the inputs of the instruction accurate within a certain number of bits. For simplicity,
we illustrate the Reversible SW-PUF design by an example of a 4-bit adder (Figure 3.1). In this
design, Reversible SW-PUF is implemented in reversible logic Toffoli (1980), Bennett (1973).
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Fredkin gate Fredkin and Toffoli (1982) is used as the Boolean basis for conservative logic because
it is universal.
Figure 3.1 Reversible SW-PUF Design (4-bit responses)
Since Fredkin gates are based on Transmutation Gates(TGs), and TGs are slow compare to a
regular gate, we propose to use two ALUs (fast-ALU, rev-ALU). The actual computation values
consumed by the following program instructions occur at the fast-ALU. The rev-ALU is used only
for verification. We need to ensure that the execution time of the rev-ALU both in the forward and
the backward computation modes is less than the execution time of the fast-ALU. For an N -bit
fast-ALU, the rev-ALU is divided into several segments of k < N bits. To define the maximum
length of each segment, the following constraint is used:
(
Tfast ALU
TB rev ALU + TF rev ALU
) ≥ 1 (3.1)
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Where Tfast ALU is the worst-case delay to execute an instruction using the fast ALU.
TB rev ALU and TF rev ALU are the worst case delays over all segments in forward and backward
computation using revALU. As shown in Figure 3.2, we propose to divide the reversible ALU into
four segments of 8-bits each for a 32-bit fast-ALU. This satisfies the delay constraint equation and
still provides an acceptable uniqueness.
Figure 3.2 ALU based Reversible SW-PUF
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3.5 Verifiable Computation Scheme
In this section an efficient Verifiable Computation Scheme based on Reversible SW-PUF is
proposed. The proposed scheme fits with a probabilistic consistency guarantee. In this scheme,
we are interested in estimating the probability of a cloud service to return a correct result for the
outsourced function. The main idea is to bind the verification scheme to the cloud service hardware
by entangling the computation with the SW-PUF. When the cloud computes the function, an
instruction sequence I0, I1, I2, . . . , In for each instruction Il generates relevant attributes which
are the two data inputs for the lth instruction - X l0, X
l
1, the instruction output Y
l, and the PUF
output Pl.
Effectively, the cloud node generates a signature (response) for each instruction (challenge) in
the execution path. This entire sequence of challenge-response pairs will be returned to the client
as a proof of computational consistency.
For the verification process, the client can verify the behavior of a program slice of variable
granularities. Most straightforward granularity is to verify an individual instruction behavior. Pick
a random challenge-response( Ck, Rk) pair of an instruction Ik to verify. The client needs to send
the response part (the instruction output Y k, and the PUF output Pk) to the cloud node. The
cloud instantiates the reversible SW-PUF to re-compute the challenge from the response (the data
inputs of the instruction (X ′ k0 , X
′ k
1 ). Only the cloud node that computed the original signature
will be able to compute the inverse PUF, so that (X ′ k0 , X
′ k




1 ) in the
original computation’s proof of consistency within a large number of bits. We assume that over
all the clients and programs, the amount of data is too large to be archived by the cloud node
preventing a look-up based response to the verification step.
Repeating this verification process for all the n instructions is not feasible because a large number
of instructions could be executed during a program run. As we discuss later, an alternative approach
to pick a subset of instructions is used to increase the confidence interval for the verification while
maintaining an efficient verification.
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Static program slices raise this granularity naturally. Static program slicing was introduced
by Weiser Weiser (1981). It is a technique for reducing a program to a minimal form that still
retains the original program computation for a given variable at a chosen point. An example of a
program and a backward slice with respect to slicing criterion < 19, x > is given in Figure 3.3 and
3.4. Merging the program slicing technique with our verification scheme leads to a more efficient
Verifiable Computation. A program slice’s input/output consistency can be established with the
Reversible SW-PUF method. For a program slice, all of the instructions in its execution flow can
be verified leading to a deterministic verification. The program slices can be extracted to maximize
certain static properties.
Figure 3.5 describes an example of a client that wants to run the program on a cloud server
using the proposed protocol:
Client: • Send the program P and the inputs to the server.
• Generate a backward slice S using control flow graph shown in Figure 3.4.
• Run slice S on a trusted device.
• Collect the inputs (challenges) of the Reversible SW-PUF (forward mode) for each in-
struction in the execution path for the slice.
Server: • Run the program and generate SW-PUF signatures (the responses Ri in challenge-
response pairs) for each instruction in the execution path of the program P .
• Send the results of the program in addition to the SW-PUF signatures sequence Ri to
the client.
Client: • Perform a consistency check on the SW-PUF inputs (challenges Ci) generated for the
slice S, and the PUF signatures Ri received form the server.
• Pick a subset of the SW-PUF signatures Ri0 , Ri1 , . . . , Rik to verify. More comprehensive
verification will verify each instruction within the slice S. An interactive verification can
pick a subset of instructions from the dominant control-flow paths within S. Regardless,
only the response of an individual instruction Ril is sent to the server at a time.
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Figure 3.3 An Example of Program slicing
Server: • Run the SW-PUF in reverse mode with its output asserted to the response Ri to be
verified. The reverse computation generates the input (challenge Ci) of the PUF.
Client: • Confirm that the challenge Ci does match the response Ri for this SW-PUF given the
(Ci, Ri) pairs from the original program execution at the server. As we describe later, a
reversible SW-PUF match means that the challenge Ci does not equal the inputs of the
ALU at specific bit positions given an early sampling period.
• Iterate over the slice S instructions, and over all the slices.
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Figure 3.4 An Example of control flow graph
• The slices to be verified will ideally be picked so that the probability of behavior mis-
representation for the adversary are minimized.
• Apply Bayesian Inference model to get probabilistic proof about the server’s results.
For choosing the slice set in our scheme, two elements are critical: the size of the slice, and the
number of slices. Since small slices result in more efficient verification (According to Binkley et al.
(2007), the average slice contains just under one-third of the program) we propose to use a selection
method based on the super-node Zhang et al. (2018) algorithm to reduce the verification effort.
However, certain types of program control flow graphs may not be amenable to small slices, and in
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Figure 3.5 The proposed protocol
such a case, different methods could be applied. As in any interactive proof system, increasing the
number of slices will increase confidence in the computed results. To provide a desired probabilistic
proof about the server’s results, we propose to use a Bayesian Inference Dempster (1968) model
to determine the appropriate number of static slices required.
Slices Selection:
Given a program P that contains a set of instructions S, our goal is to find a subset of S called
M such that M exhibits the same behavior as S with respect to one of the program outputs. Once
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we find M , while we want to generate static slices SS that go through M , the selection of M must be
based in some randomized algorithm to prevent an adversary from producing the same M to cheat.
For choosing M , we used the algorithm in Zhang et al. (2018), for selecting all the super-nodes
in P as our set of desired nodes. A super-node is formed from a strict dominator-post-dominator
pair. A node X is defined as a dominator to a node Y if every path from the start node to Y goes
through X. Similarly, a node X is defined as a post-dominator to a node Y if all paths to the exit
node of the graph starting at Y go through X. The super-node method will reduce the proposed
verification scheme overhead. Verifying at least one instruction from each super-node block will
be sufficient to verify the entire slice. The following algorithm summarizes the steps needed for
selecting the desired static slices.
Algorithm 1 Static Slices Selection
1: Generate Control Flow Graph CFG for P .
2: for each function F in CFG
3: Find all super-nodes in F and add them to N .
4: end for
5: Randomly select a subset of super-nodes from N and add
them to M .
6: for each super-node in M
7: Generate a backward static slice SS that goes through
the selected node and highlight these nodes.
8: end for
Probabilistic Verification Algorithms:
In this section, we propose use of a Bayesian inference on a binomial proportion method to verify
the outsourced computation statistically. Bayesian inference is a statistical technique to update our
subjective beliefs as new evidence or data becomes available. Our objective here is to characterize
the probability density function for the outsourced computation correctness given that a set of
slices were run correctly. In particular, we are interested in estimating confidence in verifying the
correctness of the calculation results returned by an untrusted cloud server. Bayesian computation
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of probability distributions starts with a prior belief about a model parameter, then updates this
distribution based on observed data to produce new posterior beliefs.
Before discussing the Bayesian procedure, we will state some underlying assumptions about our
approach.
• We are going to assume that in verification of execution, the slice can only have two outcomes,
pass or fail.
• Each slice generation is independent of the others, i.e. we use a random generator to identify
the slicing criteria used in slice generation.
• Since we have no prior belief about the correctness of the results, we chose a uniform density
of the beta distribution Beta (α, β) Gupta and Nadarajah (2004) to quantify our prior beliefs.
As stated above, we are interested in estimating the probability, given that a set of random slices
passed the verification process, that the results returned by a server are correct. The mathematical
definition of the Bayesian method is as follows: this method relies on Bayes
p(H|D) = p(D|H)× p(H)
p(D)
(3.2)
Where H denotes our hypothesis, the correctness of the returned results, and D represents the
evidence or the data, the number of slices that passed the verification.
P (H|D) is the posterior probability distribution. This is the probability distribution of our belief
of hypothesis H after evidence D has been taken into account.
P (H) is the prior probability distribution, the strength in our belief of hypothesis H before any
evidence D is observed.
P (D|H) is the likelihood function, representing the probability of data D as generated by a set
of models with parameter H. The probability density functions of the likelihood function can be
chosen depending on the characteristics of the system, and in our approach, we propose to use the
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binomial distribution Annett (1967) since we assume that the verification of slice execution can







P(D) is the evidence probability distribution, the total probability of the data.
For simplicity, we will assume that P(D) =1, implying that any failure in one slice will cause
rejection of the returned results. After applying the Bernoulli Function and the beta distribution
Beta (α, β) in the Bayesian equation, we obtain the following equation:










)× µ2, β = α× ( 1
µ
− 1) (3.5)
3.6 Evaluation of the Reversible SW-PUF
We evaluate of 32-bit Reversible SW-PUF in HSPICE k-2015.06 using predictive technology
model HiSIM241 [13] for all NMOS/PMOS transistors with a VDD of 3 V. The HiSIM241 model
supports Design for Manufacturability (DFM). Matlab was used to generate random values for
the DFM parameters for each transistor which creates 16 different patterns of PUF instances. We
studied three metrics: uniqueness, randomness, and reliability.
3.6.0.1 Uniqueness
Uniqueness measures the capability to distinguish between different devices. Hamming Dis-
tances (HD) between PUF responses are used to measure uniqueness. An ideal HD between any
two PUF responses is 50% (16-bit).
To evaluate the uniqueness of the Reversible SW-PUF on the same ALU under different data
inputs (Intra-chip ), we measured the average HD distribution between a pair of output data on
the same device PUF instance with different set of input data.
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The uniqueness of the forward signature for the Reversible SW-PUF has been measured the
same way as the regular SW-PUF Hamadeh and Tyagi (2019). Figure 3.6 (A) shows that the
maximum Hamming distance was 12 (38% of PUF response bits); the minimum was 3 (9% of PUF
response bits); and the average was 6.6 (21% of PUF response bits). For the reverse computation,
both ALUs inputs were measured on ten different PUF instances with identical output (response,
which constitutes the input for a reversible PUF in reverse mode). The Hamming distance between
each pair of different ALUs was calculated. Figure 3.6 (B) shows that the maximum Hamming
distance was 14 (44% of PUF response bits); the minimum was 4 (13% of PUF response bits); and
the average was 9.5 (30% of PUF response bits).
Figure 3.6 Hamming distance distribution of reversible SW-PUF: (A) Forward mode; (B)
Reverse mode
3.6.0.2 Randomness
Randomness evaluates a PUF signature by analyzing the distribution of 0’s and 1’s. The stan-
dard statistical test suite of the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) Bassham
et al. (2010) was used to evaluate the responses of the reversible SW-PUF. We have applied the
NIST tests to 512-bit stream that was produced from the 16 PUF instances. Table 3.1 shows the
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statistical tests results that were observed. Only two category (rank and linear complexity), out of
fifteen statistical tests applied was failed.
Table 3.1 Summary results of statistical tests on reversible SW-PUF responses.
0 #Statistical Test Avg. Success
1 Frequency 96.875%
2 Block Frequency 96.875%
3 Cumulative Sums 96.875%
4 Run 96.875%
5 Longest Run 96.875%
6 Rank 0%





12 Approximate Entropy 100%
13 Serial 100%
14 LinearComplexity 0.8437%
The minimum pass rate for each statistical test is approximately 90.6%
3.6.0.3 Reliability
Reliability measures robustness of a PUF in the presence of environmental variations. Tem-
perature variations are the main factor that affect the stability of a PUF response. Therefore,
reliability can be determined by varying the operating temperature and comparing the responses
with a reference response obtained under nominal temperature conditions for the same input. We











where Ri is the reference response at room temperature 25°C, Ri,j is a response observed under
varying temperature value for the same challenge, n is the number of bits of reversible SW-PUF,
and K is the number of samples. Figure 3.7 shows the reliability results for the responses of the
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Reversible SW-PUF for both the forward and backward computations. The reversible PUF is very
stable under the temperature variation from -10°C to 65°C.
Figure 3.7 The reliability of reversible SW-PUF against temperature variations
3.7 Case Study: Verification of Matrix Multiplication
In this section, we evaluate the proposed method thorough a matrix multiplication experiment, a
widely-used example in Verifiable Computation Systems Hui et al. (2018) , Zhang et al. (2017). We
considered the following scenario: a client C needs to multiply two large scale matrices A(n×n)and
B(n×n) using a cloud service S. However, since the client C does not completely trust the cloud S
to return the correct results for multiplication, the client C could verify the results in many ways.
A naive algorithm could replicate the multiplication using another cloud service and compare the
results, but this method is expensive, e.g., multiplying n×n matrices execute O(n3) time using the
standard method. A faster check could use Freivalds’ algorithm Freivalds (1979), a probabilistic
randomized algorithm that verifies matrix multiplication in O(kn2) with a probability of failure
less than 2−k. Our approach improves Freivalds’ algorithm by reducing the running time of the
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verification process by a factor of O(n). Finally, we compare the execution time of our approach
with the Verifiable Computation method proposed in Zhang et al. (2017).
3.7.0.1 Experimental Setup
We implemented a C++ tool to generate the random slices and perform the verification, and a
LLVM compiler framework Lattner and Adve (2004) to compile the matrix multiplication program
into LLVM Immediate Representation (IR). We used the Symbiotic 3 tool Chalupa et al. (2016) to
obtain the backward static slice for the program. Symbiotic 3 linked with C++ code to generate
the random slices in which the slicing criterion was one element of the output matrix. The number
of slices was chosen based on the Bayesian Inference model. For simplicity, we assumed that client
C challenges must completely match the server signatures, and any failure will result in rejection of
the verification. Finally, a Pin tool Luk et al. (2005) was used to generate the desired instruction
traces, while HSPICE was used to represent the Reversible SW-PUF to generate the signatures.
Figure 3.8 shows an example of the proposed tool in which the Client C must choose the desired
probability, after which the tool will generate the appropriate number of slices.
Figure 3.8 An example of generating the desired slices
3.7.0.2 Performance evaluation
We performed the experiments for evaluating our scheme and present the computation time
cost for each of its elements. The resultant time cost was obtained by averaging the outcomes of
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testing 10 different randomly generated inputs of the matrix multiplication code for matrix sizes
ranging from 1000 to 7000.
As shown in Figure 3.9, the beta distribution can be used to model the prior and posterior of
our beliefs. In Figure 3.9, we present three values of posterior beliefs; all of them start with the
same prior (0.5, 0.1) this range is used to represent the absence of the prior information. The first
posterior distribution is assessed after observing and verifying 100 slices; the probability of the total
computation correctness was about 0.9. While observing and verifying 900 slices will increase the
probability of the correctness to about 0.98.
Figure 3.9 The prior and posterior belief distributions for various experiment
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Figure 3.10 Computational time cost comparison between the Server and the Client sides
Table 3.2 shows a computational cost comparison between the server S (i.e. Matrix Multipli-
cation, Reverse computations) and the client C (i.e. Slices Generation ”the number of slices was
picked to produce a probability of more than 0.97”, Signatures Verification) sides. As we can see
from Figure 3.10, the total computation time on the client C side was negligible compared to the
total computation time on the server S side. For example, when n = 1000, the total time executed
on the server S side was about 0.0209s, while the total time needed on the client C side was only
about 0.01s. When n = 7000, the total time executed on the server S side was about 45.573s,
while the total time needed on the client C side was only about 0.021s.
Table 3.2 Computation cost of proposed scheme for different problem size.
Dimension Verification at Client Side Computations at Server Side
Slices Generation Signatures Verification Matrix Multiplication Reverse computations
n= 1000 10.025 ms 0.570 ms 0.201 s 0.008 s
n= 2000 11.504 ms 0.684 ms 2.129 s 0.078 s
n= 3000 12.753 ms 0.746 ms 6.372 s 0.183 s
n= 4000 15.025 ms 0.866 ms 12.479 s 0.366 s
n= 5000 16.875 ms 0.925 ms 20.692 s 0.675 s
n= 6000 17.752 ms 0.990 ms 29.668 s 1.065 s
n= 7000 20.057 ms 1.136 ms 44.050 s 1.523 s
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We evaluate the advantage of our scheme by comparing our experiment with the PVCBMM
scheme proposed in Zhang et al. (2017). Both of the experiments are performed on the same
computer properties. However, we used the Strassen's algorithm Huss-Lederman et al. (1996) to
reduce the time required to multiply matrices. We studied seven dimensions size ranging from 1000
to 7000. As shown in Table 3.3, the experimental results reveal that our scheme is more efficient
than the PVCBMM scheme.
Table 3.3 Computation and Verification cost between two schemes.
Dimension The proposed scheme PVCBMM scheme Zhang et al. (2017)
Computations cost Verification cost Computations cost Verification cost
n= 1000 0.201 s 0.018 s 1.75 s 6.94 s
n= 2000 2.12 s 0.090 s 4.36 s 14.86 s
n= 3000 6.37 s 0.19 s 8.35 s 32.26 s
n= 4000 12.47 s 0.38 s 24.62 s 61.37 s
n= 5000 20.69 s 0.69 s 36.31 s 85.03 s
n= 6000 29.66 s 1.08 s 65.16 s 178.54 s
n= 7000 44.05 s 1.54 s 105.28 s 193.86 s
3.8 Adversary Model
There are many possible threat behaviors that can cause a server cloud node to return incorrect
results, and in this paper, we will consider the following:
Dishonest Server: In this model the server may alter the inputs to reduce the number of
computations.
Hardware or Software Failures: An error may occur during the computation and the
server will not redo the computation but instead present fake results.
Malicious attacks: An unauthorized attacker may be able to access the cloud node and
inject malicious code that will affect result quality.
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All these models can be discovered using the proposed scheme, so the client can detect a mismatch
in the returned signatures with high probability.
3.9 Conclusions
We present reversible SW-PUF, a novel PUF design for computing partial inputs given a set
of outputs. We implemented the reversible SW-PUF in HSPICE and established its desirable
properties (uniqueness, randomness, and reliability). We then provided an efficient interactive
verifiable computation scheme based on the proposed PUF and based on the Bayesian method.
Our approach links outsourced computation with server cloud node hardware to provide proof of
correctness of the results with high probability. We evaluated our verifiable computation scheme
and demonstrated that it yields faster verification than previous approaches.
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CHAPTER 4. PRIVACY PRESERVING DATA PROVENANCE MODEL
BASED ON PUF FOR SECURE INTERNET OF THINGS
Modified from a paper accepted by IEEE-iSES 2019 conference
Hala Hamadeh and Akhilesh Tyagi
4.1 Abstract
Data provenance to maintain data integrity and authenticity is a significant challenge in the
Internet of Things (IoT) environments. Additionally, if the provenance metadata itself can be com-
municated in a privacy preserving manner, it expands the usage of IoT systems to human societal
domains where privacy is of paramount importance. In this paper, we present a scheme to com-
bine data provenance and privacy-preserving solutions. Our scheme merges Physical Unclonable
Function (PUF) technology with non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to provide trustworthy and
dependable IoT systems. In this context, the IoT device can anonymously send data to the cor-
responding server associated with the proof of ownership. First, we propose a privacy-preserving
data provenance protocol. This protocol was synthesized with Altera Quartus. It was implemented
on an Altera Cyclone IV FPGA to demonstrate its practicality and feasibility. Most of the protocol
steps take time of the order of 40µ sec establishing its practicality.
4.2 Introduction
The Internet of Things (IoT) technology deployment has been growing exponentially within the
last decade Conti et al. (2018); Srinivasan et al. (2019); Lu and Da Xu (2018). IoT’s are everywhere
from a smart and connected home, to hospitals, to military & agriculture Firouzi et al. (2018); Ray
(2018); Abdel-Basset et al. (2019). This is still the proverbial tip of an iceberg. The ceiling for IoT
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deployment still has much further to go. This growth brings along several challenges, specially in
the area of cyber-security.
Provenance and privacy preservation are considered two important factors within IoT cber-
security domain due to the fact that the data is transmitted over communication channels. More
specifically, in an IoT system, data provenance refers to the metadata that describes the ownership,
creation process, and modification of data. Providing secure data provenance aims to establish the
trust in the data collected among the IoT devices Aman et al. (2017). Moreover, since IoT networks
are ideally open systems to allow plug-in functionality extension, the data provenance should be
communicated in a way so that the privacy of the provenance provider is not violated by leaking un-
necessary information. This is what a privacy preserving data provenance model seeks to establish.
Physical Unclonable Functions (PUF) are good candidates for providing a unique device-specific
identity. Such unique silicon biometric identities can be a good source of data provenance. Software
PUF (SW-PUF) Hamadeh and Tyagi (2019) composes the silicon fabrication process variation with
the software input defined execution paths to generate reproducible randomness that is both device
and software dependent to serve as a hardware-software fingerprint. This functionality allows the
SW-PUF to provide unique metadata to certify if a specific IoT device executed a specific data
creation or modification program Hamadeh and Tyagi (2019).
Privacy-preservation deals with protection of the IoT devices’ identities. One mechanism to
keep the identity private is based on non-interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof Rackoff and Simon
(1991). Furthermore, integration of the data provenance with the privacy-preserving protocols is
expected to provide a significant benefit in many IoT scenarios. For instance, consider health-
care monitoring in an elder care center. Many vital signs for the elderly patients, such as heart
rate, respiration flow rates, and temperature, could be tracked. In this case, trust in the received
data could derive from trust in the identity of properly registered IoT sensors. However, if the
data transmission protocol reveals the identity of the specific IoT sensors, it automatically reveals
the patient identity. Any exposure of such sensitive data by unauthorized parties is considered
as a violation of federal health insurance portability and accountability act rules. Moreover, any
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tampering or modification of this data can lead to fatal outcomes Adhikary et al. (2019). This
makes trust in the received data from the IoT sensors very critical. We believe a privacy preserving
data provenance model provides backbone for such a trust model.
In this work, we propose a novel privacy preserving data provenance model based on Physical
Unclonable Functions and Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof systems. This framework guar-
antees that the received data from an IoT device is collected from a registered authorized device;
that it can be verified that the said authorized device ran a specific authorized data creation or
modification program; and that the preceding two properties can be established without reveal-
ing the device identity. Specifically, the proposed solution contributes to achieving the following
security goals:
• Source Identity Authenticity: guarantees that the data originated from the specific IoT device
that sent it.
• Privacy-Preserving Identity: ensures that the real identity of the owner of the data is not
unveiled.
• Data Integrity: confirms that the data transmitted is not tampered with.
• Device Trust: ensures that the device is not exploited by a malicious code.
4.3 Related Work
Recently, several data provenance protocols have been investigated in literature Kamal et al.
(2018); Elkhodr et al. (2018); Jaigirdar et al. (2019). However, only a few of these studies focus
both on the data provenance and privacy-preserving protocols for an IoT system.
For instance, in Sanchez et al. (2018), the authors extended the IBM Idemix protocol with
a non-interactive zero-knowledge proof to sign the metadata transmitted by an IoT device in a
privacy-preserving way. However, this solution is limited to only some types of systems. The
work in Alharbi and Lin (2012), investigates the privacy-preserving data provenance. However,
their design relies on the trust of the server itself on an ecosystem. Few other techniques establish
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secure data provenance based on PUFs. The authors in Javaid et al. (2018) proposed to use
PUF with blockchain network in order to add a unique hardware fingerprint to each IoT device.
Their proposed solution depends on storing many Challenge Response Pairs (CRPs) in the server
memory exposing them to storage attack concerns. In Aman et al. (2017), Aman et. al have
used the Received Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) along with PUF and symmetric encryption to
provide the privacy of the transmitted metadata between the IoT device and the server. Similar
to the work in Javaid et al. (2018), this scheme also relies on storing many CRPs in the server; in
addition it also relies on the RSSI values which is not practical in some IoT environments. On the
contrary, our solution attempts to overcome all these issues.
4.4 Privacy Preserving data provenance protocol
In this section, we describe our scheme for secure data provenance in an IoT system. The
proposed protocol encompasses four stages. The first stage (called the Setup and Enrollment
stage) is to generate public parameters required by the following stages in the protocol. These
parameters are associated with an IoT device profile indexed by a virtual ID assigned to an IoT
device by the server. The second stage, called authentication stage, is to prove the identity of
an IoT device to the server ensuring its privacy. The third stage, called Key Exchange stage, is
to exchange a symmetric key between a server and an IoT device. The last stage, called Data
Transmission and Verification stage, is to start trusted communication between an IoT device and
the server which confirms the source of the transmitted data. Our design is based on a software
PUF and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs. The SW-PUF Hamadeh and Tyagi (2019) is used
to provide a proof of identity and root of trust for an IoT device. This type of PUF ensures that the
data generated and processed by an IoT device is measured as it is computed inside the IoT device
itself. This is beneficial in proving the provenance of the data. Non-interactive zero-knowledge
proofs were used to ensure secure privacy-preserving communication between an IoT device and a
server in the authentication process. The elliptic curve cryptography over Binary Fields GF(2m)
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was chosen in order to reduce the computational requirements for the IoT devices while maintaining
the security level of other mathematical frameworks.
A SW-PUF exploits the fact that in an ALU (carry-ripple adder like design), the delays to
settle the output (si) or carry (ci) bits are data-dependent. For some input combinations for A+B
the carry-chain takes only time proportional to one bit-slice, whereas for some others it takes time
proportional to n bit slices (for n bits input data). Average case delay is proportional to O(log n).
Similarly, the delays are silicon foundry dependent along the lines of all PUFs due to process
variations. In synchronous designs, we pick a clock period corresponding to worst case delay of
O(n). However, if we pick an output sampling period closer to logN , we see both input data
and silicon dependent randomness. This serves as a software PUF that verifies both the device
identity through silicon randomness and software identity through execution paths leading to a
specific sequence of data inputs. If such an adder were to be build with reversible logic, such as
transmission gate logic, with conservative logic such as Fredkin-Toffoli gates, it can also certify its
identity to a third party through an interactive challenge-response verification. Its responses Ri to
various input combinations Ci can be recorded as (Ci,Ri) CRPs. If the verifier has access to these
(Ci,Ri) CRPs, it can randomly pick a challenge Ci and ask the SW-PUF to generate the Ci in the
reverse mode. If the protocol ensures that the prover device is not able to use precached (Ci,Ri)
pairs to respond, we can ensure that the SW-PUF exists at the device and behaves as anticipated.
4.4.0.1 Enrollment and Setup stage
This stage is performed only once when an IoT device is deployed in the field for the first time.
An IoT device and a server prepare all parameters required to perform the authentication protocol
in the future and agree on a virtual ID for communication with the IoT device. The following steps
will be performed by an IoT device to generate public parameters required by the following stages:
Note, none of the parameters generated in this stage contain sensitive information, thus, it is safe
to transmit them over an open communication channel.
Device: • Select elliptic curve E over Binary Fields GF(2m)
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• Choose base point G = (Gx,Gy). Not that in ECC, many parameters like G are points
in 2-dimensional space. We will often refer to the x and y components of such points by
notation Gx and Gy respectively.
• Compute public Key A = x·G where x is the SW-PUF signature that has been generated
during the bootup of the device.
• Share the public parameters {G = (Gx,Gy), A = (Ax,Ay)} with the server.
Server: • Generate Virtual id (V id) for the device to use in future communications.
• Store the public parameters associated with this V id.
4.4.0.2 Authentication stage
The authentication of the identity of an IoT device could be performed based on SW-PUF
Hamadeh and Tyagi (2019) and non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs like IBM Idemix Camenisch
and Van Herreweghen (2002), Wallrabenstein (2016). Our protocol uses a unique SW-PUF signa-
ture (x) that can be generated during the bootup phase of the device to authenticate the execution
environment of the device, or it can be generated every time a new data is produced or processed to
authenticate the data creation or modification step at a specific IoT device. If a log of a sequence
of data creation and modification events at a specific IoT device needs to be authenticated, then a
chained hash of these raw SW-PUF signatures in the order of events’ occurrence is needed. This is
similar to the way a TPM maintains platform configuration registers (PCRs). Then, this signature
hash needs to be saved in a protected memory in the IoT device that we will refer to as Metadata
Tracking Register (MTR). MTR’s role is similar to the TPM’s PCR. It holds a chained hash of
provenance metadata evolution through creation and modification steps. The MTR can only be
updated through MTR extension API which takes the hash of current MTR value concatenated
with the new SW-PUF signature val as the new MTR value MTR ← h(MTR(v)||val), same as
the PCR extension. Figure 4.1 shows the proposed protocol for this stage.
The authentication protocol is based on non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs Rackoff and
Simon (1991). These protocols can prove the knowledge or possession of a value to a verifier without
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requiring multiple interactive steps (as in traditional zero-knowledge proofs). This verification leaks
zero information about the value known to the prover. Let the value known to the prover be x.
The prover generates two derived values from x, a t-value given by t = ft(x,K) - a function of the
secret value x and several public parameters such as a key K, and potentially others such as nonces;
a s-value given by s = fs(x,K) - a function of the secret value x and several public parameters
such as a key K, and potentially others such as nonces. The functions fs and ft allow the verifier
to check on some mathematical properties of s and t combined which is not likely to hold unless
the prover knows x. But s and t together do not reveal x. The IoT device (Prover) performs the
following steps every time the device boots up to start a trusted communication with the server
(Verifier):
Figure 4.1 Authentication protocol
Prover: • Ask the Server (Verifier) to initiate the communication.
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Verifier: • Send a random nonce to the prover to ensure that old communications cannot be
reused.
Prover: • Compute v = hash( nonce|| x|| all public parameters|| . . . ).
• Compute t-value where t = v · G. Note that G is a pulic parameter generated during
enrollment.
• Generate challenge c = hash(t-value || all public parameters || . . . ).
• Compute s-value where s = v + c · x.
• Send t-value, s-value to the verifier.
Verifier: • Compute c′ = hash (t-value|| all public parameters|| . . . )
• Compute t′-value = s ·G− c′ · A. Note that A is a public key generated and published
during enrollment.
• Verify that t-value = t′-value holds.
• Reject in case of a mismatch.
Once the server (verifier) authenticates the IoT device (prover) s/he sends Virtual id (V id) to
the device for future communications. Note that V id was generated during enrollment, but not
shared with the IoT device until after authentication. The IoT device could update the metadata
tracking register (MTR) value as follows: MTRnew ← hash(MTRold = SW − PUF at bootup).
This version of MTR however reveals the raw SW-PUF bootup signature. We need to hide it
with some other random parameters. We, however, cannot use non-reproducible parameters such
as time or a random nonce. An MTR digest should be reproducible for the same sequence of
bootup, data creation, and data modification events for the verifiability, just as PCR digests are.
One solution to this is to create a special program module called nonce-parameter-generator (
seed ). When this program executes, SW-PUF generates its signature, which can be used as a
nonce like hiding parameter. The seed could be the bootup SW-PUF signature in MTRold, which
should be reproducible for the future device boot ups. This is the version we propose to use:
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MTRnew ← hash(MTRold||nonce − parameter − generator(MTRold)). The prover/device sends
this MTRnew to the server/verifier to be used in the future steps.
4.4.0.3 Key Exchange stage
To ensure secure communication between the IoT device and the server, we use symmetric
AES encryption algorithm Srinivas and Akramuddin (2016) for better efficiency in place of an
asymmetric encryption system. In this section, we explain the key agreement process between the
device and the server. We use a hash function with a standard key exchange based on elliptic curve
Diffie-Hellman protocol Ahirwal and Ahke (2013) to generate and exchange the AES key between
the two parties. The following explanation outlines the main steps:
Device: • Choose private key kd where kd < 2m.
• Compute public Key Qd = kd ·G. Recall that m and G are public parameters.
• Share the public parameters (Qdx,Qdy) with the server.
Server: • Choose private key ks where ks < 2m .
• Compute public Key Qs = ks ·G
• Share the public parameters (Qsx,Qsy) with the IoT device.
Device: • Compute shared Key Kds = kd ·Qs
• Compute AES key KAES = hash(Kds)
Server: • Compute shared Key Kds = ks ·Qd
• Compute AES key KAES = hash(Kds)
4.4.0.4 Data Transmission and Verification stage
In this section, we propose a transmission and verification protocol for securing the data trans-
mission and providing verification of the provenance in IoT environments. As we stated earlier, the
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AES algorithm has been chosen to encrypt/decrypt all the transmitted messages. The proposed
protocol consists of three phases: Init Communication: where the IoT device initiates the commu-
nication by sending the V id and the stored MTR value. Generating Data: where the IoT device
generates both the data and the metadata and sends them the server. Verify Data Provenance:
where the server verifies the data by confirming the source of the data. The proposed protocol is
shown in Figure 4.2. The following steps describe each phase. This protocol needs to be repeated
for every data transmitted from an IoT device to a server:
Figure 4.2 Data Transmission and Verification protocol
Device: • Ask the Server (Verifier) to initiate the communication.
• Send V id and current MTR value.
Server: • Locate the MTRvalue for the received V id and verify it.
• Reject in case of mismatch.
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Device: • Generate the data and SW-PUF signature (metadata) of a data creation/modification
event generated by the SW-PUF.
• Update MTR value with the new metadata.
MTRnew ← hash(MTRold||SW PUF signature).
• Send Data and metadata consisting of MTRnew and SW-PUF (Ci,Ri) pairs to the
server.
Server: • Verify the received metadata MTRnew and SW PUF signature against the old value
MTRold associated with V id by checking the equalityMTRnew = hash(MTRold||SW PUF signature).
• Reject in case of mismatch.
• Save current time t.
• Pick a small subset of the helper SW-PUF (Ci,Ri) pairs. Verify the existence and
integrity of SW-PUF by sending the response Ri part of the selected subset asking the
prover to generate the corresponding Ci part through reversible computation.
Device: • Run the SW-PUF in reverse mode to generate the challenge Ci corresponding to the
received Ri.
• Send Ci to the server.
Server: • Save current time t′.
• Verify that (t′ − t) < δ. This check ensures that Ci is computed in a reverse mode. An
untruthful device would have needed more than δ time to perform additional computa-
tions or to retrieve it from a secondary storage. Note that we also assume that relative
to the IoT device small cache, the (Ci,Ri) sets are significantly larger - preventing a
cached response to bypass reverse computation.
• Verify if the received response Rireceived matches the response Ri from the (Ci,Ri) pairs
received at the MTR verification stage.
• Reject in case of mismatch.
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• Update MTR value.
4.5 Threat model
Following are some of the objectives of an attacker for the proposed protocol:
• Mimic an IoT device and transfer maliciously modified data to the server.
This attack cannot be applicable in our scheme since the IoT device identity is based on PUF
which makes it close to impossible to generate or clone a fake identity.
• Tamper or modify the data sent by a valid IoT device.
This attack can be detected by the proposed verification protocol, where the MTR value will
not match the saved MTR value at the server.
4.6 Implementation
Complete design of the proposed privacy-preserving data provenance protocol has been modeled
in Verilog (HDL), simulated by ModelSim XE, synthesis with Altera Quartus and implemented on
FPGA Altera Cyclone iv at speed of 50 MHz. The AES-128 encryption and decryption algorithm,
SHA-256 hash function, ECC over Binary Fields GF(2233) engine. All the other proposed protocols
in this paper also map to the FPGA. The SW-PUF is the only component not mapped to the FPGA
since reversible computation using transmission gate logic is not feasible in an FPGA fabric. The
data and the metadata (SW-PUF signatures) generation was performed in software using HSPICE
k-2015.06 and Pin tool (dynamic binary instrumentation tool) Reddi et al. (2004).
As we explain earlier, the public-key cryptography used in the enrollment and authentication
stages was based on an Elliptic curve over the binary field. The ECC is suitable for resource-
constrained system because it can offer the same security level as other asymmetric systems for a
much smaller key size. This implementation used the recommended Curve B-233 presented in the
NIST FIPS Locke and Gallagher (2009) to provide excellent security level. The 233 bits key size
has performance comparable to RSA 2048 bits key size.
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4.7 Results
Our implementation consumes around 40K Logic Elements (LEs) for the IoT device and around
37K LEs for the IoT server. Table 4.1 reports the LEs needed for each step in our protocol. It takes
around 118µ sec to perform the enrollment, authentication, and key exchange protocols. About
120m sec is required to transfer and to verify the provenance of 1 megabyte of data and metadata.
Table 4.2 records the average execution time for each step in our protocol. Note that all the
verification steps take about the same time, but the transmission & verification time dominates.
Note: Communication time between the device and the server is not included, and it depends on
the desired communication technologies. For example, Wi-Fi can transmit data at throughput up
to 1 Gbps Li et al. (2018).
Table 4.1 Performance Results (Total Logic Elements (LEs) )
Protocol IoT Server IoT Device
Enrolment - 109
Authentication 1, 693 729
Key Exchange 22, 941 22, 941
Transmission and verification 16, 670 14, 170
Table 4.2 Performance Results (Execution Time )
Protocol IoT Server IoT Device
Enrolment - 35.4u sec
Authentication 40.1u sec 40.0u sec
Key Exchange 42.5u sec 42.5u sec
Transmission and verification 120.2m sec 71.6m sec
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4.8 Conclusions
In this paper, we present a privacy-preserving data provenance solution that merges Physi-
cal Unclonable Function (PUF) technology with non-interactive zero knowledge proof to provide
trustworthy and dependable IoT systems. In our scheme, an IoT device can anonymously send
data to an IoT server. The server enrolls an IoT device and verifies all the provenance metadata
for data creation and modification. The proposed protocol has been designed and synthesized
with Altera Quartus and implemented on FPGA Altera Cyclone iv. The implementation demon-
strates the practicality and feasibility of our solution, while the simulation results achieve practical
performance that can be deployed for Resource-Constrained IoT Devices.
A server mediated trust system could potentially become a bottleneck in IoT system scalability.
In the future, we are studying distributed systems that provide data provenance within a private
framework.
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CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
5.1 Conclusion
In this thesis we developed and analyzed tools and protocols that provide hardware security.
In Chapter 2 we presented new PUF architectures and evaluated some of their features that
included uniqueness, reliability, and randomness. We also explored some of the applications of these
architectures. We first presented a software PUF suitable for establishing a Software Protection
and Trusted Computing Base. To validate PUF behavior, we implemented our design on an FPGA
platform (Altera DE2 Development and Education Board). A simulation analysis in HSPICEk-
2015.06 using 45 nm technology was also performed. The responses measured from the software
PUF have a sufficiently good uniqueness of about 30% (50%) and more than 96% reliability for
temperatures between -10°C and 65°C. The randomness was measured with a NIST suite of 14 tests
and 12-13 tests were consistently passed with a minimum pass rate of 90.6%.
A reversible SW-PUF was also proposed to provide an efficient mechanism for verifiable com-
putations. Reversible SW-PUF is a novel PUF design for computing partial inputs given a set of
outputs. We evaluated the reversible SW-PUF in HSPICEk-2015.06 using 45 nm technology. The
analysis was performed in terms of two metrics: uniqueness and reliability. The average unique-
ness for reverse computation was 30% while for forward computation it was 21%. The reversible
software PUF exhibited reliability greater than 99% for temperatures ranging from −10C to 65C
for both forward and backward computations. Then, we provided an efficient interactive verifiable
computation scheme based on the proposed PUF and the Bayesian method. Our approach links
outsourced computation with server cloud node hardware to provide proof of correctness of the
results with high probability. We evaluated our verifiable computation scheme and demonstrated
that it yields faster verification than previous approaches.
77
Finally, we proposed a privacy-preserving data provenance solution that merges PUF technology
with non-interactive zero knowledge proof to provide trustworthy and dependable IoT systems. In
our protocol, an IoT device can anonymously send data to an IoT server. The server enrolls an IoT
device and verifies all the provenance metadata for data creation and modification. Our scheme
can guarantee that the data originated from the specific IoT device that sent it while ensures
that the real identity of the owner of the data is not unveiled. The proposed protocol has been
evaluated and synthesized with Altera Quartus and implemented on FPGA Altera Cyclone iv. The
implementation demonstrates the practicality and feasibility of our solution, while the simulation
results achieve practical performance that can be deployed for Resource-Constrained IoT Devices.
5.2 Future Work
The results presented in this work could lead to several future areas of study, including the
following:
• Study the threat of machine learning-based software modeling attacks to the SW-PUF and
the reversible SW-PUF security, and examine other possible attacks.
• Develop an error-correcting scheme to correct noise in SW-PUF responses.
• Extend an ALU-like PUF to other micro-architecture level units for complete coverage of the
instruction set architecture (ISA).
• A program-analysis algorithm could be developed to add more flexibility to the proposed
verifiable computation scheme. This would provide a client with the ability to pick the
density of the sliced samples to maximize confidence that the server will return the correct
results. Such an algorithm can also use an optimization process to pick the ideal set of slices,
possibly minimizing the probability of behavior misrepresentation by an adversary.
